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Some comments about
“Penalising model component
complexity: A principled,
practical approach to
constructing priors” by
Simpson, Rue, Martins, Riebler,
and Sørbye
Christian P. Robert and Judith Rousseau
Universite´ Paris-Dauphine, PSL, CNRS, CEREMADE, and CREST, Paris
Abstract. This note discusses the paper “Penalising model component
complexity” by Simpson et al. (2017). While we acknowledge the highly
novel approach to prior construction and commend the authors for
setting new -encompassing principles that will Bayesian modelling, and
while we perceive the potential connection with other branches of the
literature, we remain uncertain as to what extent the principles exposed
in the paper can be developed outside specific models, given their lack of
precision. The very notions of model component, base model, overfitting
prior are for instance conceptual rather than mathematical and we
thus fear the concept of penalised complexity may not further than
extending first-guess priors into larger families, thus failing to establish
reference priors on a novel sound ground.
Key words and phrases: decision-theory, Gamma-minimaxity, misspec-
ification, prior selection, robust methodology.
1. INTRODUCTION
“On the other end of the hunt for the holy grail, “objective” priors are data-
dependent and are not uniformly accepted among Bayesians on philosophical grounds.”
The most sensitive aspect of Bayesian modelling is undoubtedly the call to
a prior distribution. From Fisher onwards (Zabell, 1992), up to this very day
(Martin and Liu, 2015; Seaman et al., 2012), the concept of prior distribution has
been criticised as being alien to the sampling model and critics have pointed out
the arbitrariness of some or all aspects of chosen priors. This is most prominent
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2in weakly informative settings when the context is deemed too poor to return an
expert opinion and thus build an informed prior. The whole branch of so-called
objective (aka, reference or non-informative) Bayesian statistics (Berger et al.,
2009) has been constructed to answer and bypass such criticisms, clearly not
achieving a complete silencing of such criticisms.
“Prior selection is the fundamental issue in Bayesian statistics. Priors are the Bayesians
greatest tool, but they are also the greatest point for criticism: the arbitrariness of
prior selection procedures and the lack of realistic sensitivity analysis (...) are a
serious argument against current Bayesian practice.”
In this paper, the authors aim at providing some form of prior robust modelling,
rather than non-informative principles that are so delicate to specify, as shown
by the literature (Liseo, 2006). It is a highly timely and pertinent paper on the
selection and construction of priors. It also shows that the field of “objective”
Bayes theory is still central to Bayesian statistics and this makes a great argument
to encourage more Bayesian researchers to consider this branch of our field. This
attempt is most commendable and we hope it will induce others to enlarge and
deepen the work in this direction.
The paper starts with a review of prior selection in connection with levels of
prior information. The authors then advance some desirable principles for the
construction of priors on a collection of models that is restricted to hierarchi-
cal additive models with a latent structure. Connections with other approaches
abound, from Jeffreys priors and the asymptotic developments of Bochkina and
Green (2014), to the non-local priors of Johnson and Rossell (2010), and spar-
sity priors. (Although this may constitute the more tentative part of the paper.)
The applications are the disease mapping model of Besag et al. (1991) and the
multivariate probit model.
2. PC PRIORS
“Most model components can be naturally regarded as a flexible version of a base
model.”
The starting point for the authors’ modelling is the so-called base model. We
understand this approach operates via the (specialised?) notion of model compo-
nents, as modularity is obviously essential (if challenging) in devising reference or
default priors. However, the obvious question it induces is to figure how easy it is
to define this base model. For instance, the authors later make a connection be-
tween base models and hypothesis testing. One may wonder whether or not such
a notion always translates into a null hypothesis formulation and whether or not
this reformulation is pertinent (if only because it relates to tests). From a more
global perspective, we remain rather skeptical that there could be an automated
version of the derivation of a base model, just as there is no single version of an
“objective” Bayes prior (Kass and Wasserman, 1996; Robert, 2001). We assume
this derivation somewhat follows from the “block” idea but we wonder at how
generic model construction by blocks can be. The authors do acknowledge the
difficulty in Section 7, as an unrealistic expectation on the practitioners.
In particular defining a base model is typically done under a given parame-
terisation, which implies the whole approach fails to stay invariant under repa-
rameterisation. To illustrate our point consider the discussion in Section 4.5 on
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sparsity. The authors consider the model
y = (y1, · · · , yn) ∼ π(y|β), β ∼ Np(0,D), D = diag(D11, · · · ,Dpp) .
They define as their base model a sparse model, in essence corresponding to
β = 0, that they translate into saying Dii = 0 for all i and then into considering
as a prior on D
(1) D−1ii ∼ πτ
where πτ is the prior defined in (3.3). As the authors note, this does not lead
to a correct sparse behaviour (in other words to convincing shrinkage) and they
suggest to define as a sparse approach to the PC-prior a hierarchical prior similar
in spirit to a spike and slab, where one first selects the number of non-zero
components and then for these components only assumes (1). But it seems to us
wrong to assume that the original problem translates into imposing that the Dii’s
have to be i.i.d sparse. A more effective approach would have been to consider
y = (y1, · · · , yn) ∼ π(y|β), β ∼ Np(0, τ
−1D), D = diag(D11, · · · ,Dpp) ,
where sparsity is expressed through τ ∼ πτ , as it then becomes a global notion.
This modelling would have been much closer in spirit to the horseshoe prior
approach, but with a different prior on τ implied by the PC approach and, being
univariate, less problematic in the context of PC priors.
“Occam’s razor is the principle of parsimony, for which simpler model formulations
should be preferred until there is enough support for a more complex model.”
Assuming a base model has been constructed, we are definitely supportive of
the idea of putting a prior on the distance from the base! Even more because
this concept is parameterisation invariant, at least at the hyperparameter level.
And because it somewhat gives a definitive meaning to the repeatedly invoked
Occam’s razor, even though we feel we could easily live without this constant
reference to a vague notion proposed by a medieval monk in England. However,
unless the hyperparameter ξ is one-dimensional, this approach fails to define a
prior on ξ per se, which implies making further choices for the reference prior
modelling.
We still wonder as to the particular Kullback-Leibler divergence chosen by
the authors, KLD(π(.|ξ)||π(.|ξ0)) as opposed to KLD(π(.|ξ0)||π(.|ξ)). In terms
of interpretation, it is not obvious to us that one conveys a better notion of
complexity than the other. However, looking at the various examples in the paper,
we realised that had the second choice been made the scaling argument in Section
3.3 would have failed and the PC prior would then be undefined. Indeed, in
this case, the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the distributions N (0, ǫ2) and
N (0, σ2) is given by
1
2
(
ǫ2
σ2
− 1− log
(
ǫ2
σ2
))
≈ log
( ǫ
σ
)
when ǫ ≈ 0. Is there an explanation as to why one divergence is better than the
other that is more illuminating than the mere observation than in the Gaussian
case one works and the other fails?
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4We furthermore like Eqn (3.1) as this equation shows how the base constraint
takes one away from Jeffreys priors. However, Eqn (3.1) does not seem correct
outside the unidimensional and bijective case, due to the differentiation term.
Omitting this undefined Jacobian, one can opt for a uniform prior on the Kullback
spheres of radius d(ξ). The main part of the paper conveys a feeling of uni-
dimensionality and we were eager to see how it extends to models with many
hyperparameters, which happens in Section 6. Similarly if ξ where the mean of
the Gaussian random variable and ξ = 0 the base model, then ξ → d(ξ) is not
bijective although symmetry arguments suggest that it is enough to define a prior
on |ξ|.
There is also a potential difficulty in the feature that d(ξ) cannot be com-
puted in a general setting. (Assuming that d(ξ) has a non-vanishing Jacobian as
on page 19 sounds rather unrealistic.) Still about Section 6, handling reference
priors on correlation matrices R is a major endeavour, which should produce a
steady flow of followers, even though it is certainly easier than contemplating the
corresponding prior on a covariance matrix (Barnard et al., 2000).
“The current practice of prior specification is, to be honest, not in a good shape.
While there has been a strong growth of Bayesian analysis in science, the research
field of “practical prior specification” has been left behind.” (*p.23)
There are still (numerous) quantities to specify and calibrate in PC priors,
which may actually be deemed a good thing by Bayesians (and even by some
modellers). But overall we think this paper and its central message constitute a
terrific step for Bayesian analysis and not solely for its foundations, provided a
more directive approach is adopted.
3. PC DIFFICULTIES
A first point in the delicate implementation of the PC principle is that those PC
priors rely on several choices made in the ordering of the relevance, complexity,
nuisance level, and so on, of the parameters, in that way quite similar to reference
priors (Berger et al., 2009). While the first author also wrote a paper on Russian
roulette (Lyne et al., 2015), there is a further “Russian doll” principle at work
behind (or within) PC priors. Each shell of the Russian doll corresponds to a
further level of complexity whose order need be decided by the modeller. This
does not sound to be a very realistic assumption in a hierarchical model with
several types of parameters having only local meaning.
A second point is that the construction of those PC priors reflects another
Russian doll structure, namely one of embedded models, hence would and should
lead to a natural multiple testing methodology. Except that the first author of
the paper clearly rejected this notion during his talk at ISBA 2016, by being
opposed to testing per se.
4. FURTHER REMARKS
”We do not know precisely the thinking that underscores the choice of prior, but we
do know that they have been hugely influential. This is not a satisfactory state of
affairs.”
The paper repeats a well-known meme that computation killed the Bayesian
spirit. Plus this less common notion that priors should not be influential. Why
not?! If there is no such thing as a non-informative prior, all priors are influential
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and produce different inference outputs. What matters in the (user’s) end is to
provide a way to calibrate this output.
”While reference priors have been successfully used for classical models, they have
a less triumphant history for hierarchical models.”
This argument applies to any setting in the sense that reference priors do
require some ordering in the importance or relevance of the parameters. If there
is subjectivity at this level, this also reflects on the ill-defined nature of some
components of a hierarchical model. Especially when considering models with
latent variables.
”To date, there has been no attempt to construct a general method for specifying
weakly informative priors.”
We have no qualm about the section on ad hoc priors since we agree with
the assessment that mimicking an earlier study of a similar problem brings no
justification to another use. And about the weakly informative section, where we
agree that the lack of general principles makes the argument hard to sustain.
The base model concept is once more appealing as a concept, reminding us
of exponentially tilted models, although it is hard to see how to face the huge
arbitrariness in setting base and extension. In that respect, Definition 1 is not
particularly helpful. And Informal Definition 1 makes things worse. Setting a base
is clearly a subjective or personal prior choice that should be acknowledged as
such. About the desirable conditions, to which the authors are welcome and free
to set as they wish, D1 is not pertinent until the authors define the very notion
of non-informative. This of course sounds like a circular argument. Desideratum
D2 makes sense only when provided the sampling model allows for a division of
the parameters into blocks. And D3 is also worth considering, if pretty vague.
Desideratum D4 should first specify what an over-parameterised model is, while
D5 assumes identifiability is itself identifiable, which is not always the case (al-
though it may be the case for additive models). Desiderata D6 and D7 seem to
proceed from common sense, while D8 is not especially constrictive. Overall, we
find it fairly hard to build a theory around such vague principles, as they are too
far from methodology, which brings back the earlier comments about the very
notion of Occam’s razor.
The principles set in Section 3 are making perfect sense, although we stress
again that they do require a fair amount of calibration. And we feel that the
debate about using Cauchy versus Student’s t priors sounds like a bit of an old
saw.
”PC priors are not built to be hypothesis testing priors and we do not recommend
their direct use as such.”
There still is this feeling of a hypothesis test reformulation that occurs when
considering the base model like the null. See also the link with Johnson and Rossell
(2010) non-local priors. We forgot about Bernardo’s (2011) reformulation, which
is under-exploited.
”PC priors are defined on individual components. This distinguishes PC priors, from
reference priors, in which the priors depend on the global model structure. This
global dependence is required to ensure a proper posterior. However, the modern
applied Bayesian is far more likely to approach their modelling using a component-
wise and often additive approach.”
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1994) or of other non-informative construction techniques, we have issues with
this separation of the parameter in independent components. This feature remains
an assumption and as such it may be a poor choice. It is also hard to think of
components of the parameter as being meaningful by themselves and thus to
contemplate building extended priors on some components irrespective of what
happens to other parts of the parameter somewhat defies reason. The remark on
the PC prior construction in the context of sparse model presented above rules
out to some extent the independence construction advocated by the authors.
” Close to the base model, the PC prior is a tilted Jeffreys’ prior for pi(x|ξ), where
the amount of tilting is determined by the distance on the Riemannian manifold to
the base model scaled by the parameter λ.”
It is not clear to us that the approximation proposed
(2) π(ξ) = I(ξ)1/2 exp(−λm(ξ)) + · · ·
is actually sharper than
(3) π(ξ) = I(0)1/2λ exp(−λ
√
I(0)ξ) + · · ·
which is a direct consequence of the first approximation provided by the authors
KLD(π(x|ξ)||π(x|ξ = 0)) =
I(0)ξ2
2
+ · · ·
Then locally the PC prior behaves like an exponential prior with parameter
λ
√
I(0). This representation is less sophisticated than the authors’ presentation,
but it abstains from conveying the wrong notion that it locally resembles Jeffreys
prior. Indeed, it seems to us that the PC prior shares no common feature with
Jeffreys priors, neither locally nor globally.
5. CONCLUSION
”We still have to work them out on a case by case basis.”
While the authors have uncovered several interesting and new avenues for
exploring prior specification, we want to signal yet another avenue, associated
with the notion of Bayesian robustness, as proposed by Holmes and Watson
(2016) that we recently discussed in this journal (Robert and Rousseau, 2016).
In fine, we congratulate the authors for this radical proposal that has the
merit of defining a natural collection of priors, while integrating the constraints of
prior robustness. Formalising this most important aspect of Bayesian modelling is
absolutely essential for methodological and practical purposes, even if the current
proposal is unlikely to reach most practitioners. We do acknowledge that the
proposals made in the paper are currently exploratory, rather than directive.
Again, we stress that this proposal represents an important step in the rational
(if not objective) construction of reference or weakly informative priors (Gelman
et al., 2013).
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